A marriage of inconvenience: the politics of Grand Coalition in 21st century Germany

We have seen some strange celebrity marriages in our time, but there are arguably few political marriages that appear to the outsider to be stranger than that of the Grand Coalition, such as has been between the Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) in Germany since 2005. Such coalitions, usually, but not exclusively, between a country’s two main parties of different political ideologies hasn’t happened in the UK since 1945, but has been more prevalent over the last few years, with the Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria, and (until recently) Iceland all currently run by such governments.

But what is involved in such a political marriage of perceived inconvenience and how will this impact the upcoming Federal election on 27th September? In considering this, let us take a brief look at the whole process of this German Grand Coalition, from its formation, to its implementation, to its dissolution, before considering the future.


Formation of the Grand Coalition

Before forming a Grand Coalition during normal times (when not facing a great crisis such as economic collapse or war), parties will often engage in a crucial preparatory step; trying to find another solution. A Grand Coalition formed in normal times usually represents a failure of partisan political competition to produce any other viable government (one possible exception being Switzerland where the four largest political parties have governed together since 1959 in a ‘magic formula’).

Once other alternatives are exhausted, it then becomes a matter of surmounting the normal obstacles to forming a coalition, including, amongst others, allocating cabinet posts and deciding a common platform.

Cabinet portfolios are important, both in terms of forming a team that can work together and in providing individual parties with the means to influence the implementation of specific policies they consider important (such as the Greens holding the Environment portfolio between 1998 and 2005).

In most Liberal Democratic parliamentary systems, the head of government, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of finance are seen as the top cabinet seats. Coalitions formed in Germany have tended to give the leader and finance roles to the main party, with the junior coalition partner receiving the foreign affairs ministry along with a number of other ministries proportionate to their seats in the coalition We see examples of this both in FDP leader Walter Scheel from 1969 to 1974 and Green party leader Joshka Fischer from 1998 to 2005 (whilst exceptions include FDP leaders Heinz Starke and Rolf Dahlgrün who were Finance ministers between 1961 and 1966).

It is more difficult to resolve when both partners are almost equal in size. Indeed, one of the great stumbling blocks in 2005 was over which party should hold the leader’s (Chancellor) post. The CDU/CSU suggested their greater parliamentary size (226 to 222 seats) entitled them to lead, whilst the SPD argued that the CDU and CSU should be treated as separate entities. The resolution was a CDU Chancellor, but compensated the SPD by giving them both finance and foreign affairs, along with other important posts such as Justice and Labour (a total of 8 out of the 16 ministries).1

The reconciliation of manifestos is crucial and something that often helps build the trust required in a coalition. The more divergent the philosophies of the partners, the more difficult this is. In Germany the resulting programme included such measures as increasing the top rate of income tax directly contrary to CDU manifesto promises, and a stance generally against Turkish membership of the EU which the SPD hasn’t liked. Equally there are policies regarded as particularly unpopular, but both necessary and achievable in a grand coalition setup, such as a 3% rise in VAT, and no protection from dismissal for the first two years in employment. Once agreed upon, a platform is then formalised, in this case in a 140 page agreement, ‘Together for Germany – With Courage and Humanity’, and ratified by all parties involved as a form of contract. 2


Implementation of the Grand Coalition

Whilst the coalition’s sizeable lower house majority has not itself been challenged, we have seen clear internal divisions within parties, such as in the initial vote in 2005 when 1 in 9 of the coalition members in the Bundestag voted against Merkel becoming Chancellor. 3 Other examples may be seen in late 2007 when divisions arose over the minimum wage, and Franz Muentefering (SPD) left the cabinet in November (albeit for personal reasons) 4 , or more recently over tax cuts.5

Yet, whilst remaining unpopular in some quarters, the Coalition has been praised for its handling of the financial crisis, particularly in terms of targeting support. 6 The issue of unemployment was considered key in 2005. Obviously the economic crisis has led to sharp increases and necessitated changes in policy implementation; however, recent data has also shown surprise falls, albeit marginal, in unemployment, which some suggest has been aided by government initiatives such as the “‘Kurzarbeit’ scheme, which encourages firms to put their workers on part-time shifts rather than fire them”. 7 Regardless of the extent to which government participation has influenced the German economy, the Coalition has arguably still been able to benefit in some areas from the resulting outcomes.

One of the difficulties faced by grand coalition parties is balancing national cooperation with partisan politics in other electoral spheres. To some extent the Federalised structure of Germany mitigates this with parties in the regional assemblies (Lander) being able to seek re-election on their own administrative merit and (to some extent) genuinely localised policy platforms.

However, there are two factors which have helped undermine this: the first is the natural swing away from incumbent governments, which in this case has meant increased representation for the smaller parties; the second, is that control of regional governments in Germany help determine the composition of the upper house (Bundesrat) at a Federal level, thus further energising those voters seeking to express their opposition to the grand coalition. This has led to the Coalition losing its upper house majority in 2008, forcing subsequent reliance upon the FDP in key votes ever since.

Dissolution of the Grand Coalition

The time limit and conditions for ending any coalition, in theory, are set out when it is initially formed, usually occurring upon dissolution of the existing government prior to an electoral campaign. In practice, the mechanics of preparing for such a break, whether in selecting a party’s next candidate for chancellor, preparing a manifesto, or parties attempting to highlight ‘their particular contributions’, begins well before this.

It is, in one sense, a difficult election for the Grand Coalition partners. Both are the incumbents, limiting their scope to criticise government policy and to distance themselves from criticism. Both have to fight an election focused mainly on aspiration of what they ‘want to do’ in the future, be it tax cuts (CDU) or full employment (SPD), whilst trying to attack the plans presented by their former partners. Out of the two parties, the SPD appear to have come off worse from the Coalition: the effects from being in government continuously for the last 11 years, and sharing the last 4 with their main Conservative rivals, has arguably helped consolidate the strength of the Left Party (Die Linke) as an appealing left-wing alternative for their voters.8

Both parties have also been sizing up alternative partners whilst in government, once again hoping to get their preferred option at this election. In spite of being preferred partners, it may seem strange that recently we have seen several instances of the CDU/CSU and FDP quite visibly attacking each other. 9 Arguably, this is simply a normal part of partisan politics, and is important for three reasons: firstly, it aims to satisfy potential voters that there is no ‘secret deal’, and that their votes will impact the result; secondly, it aims to satisfy existing supporters that a party will stand up for issues that are particularly important for them, even in negotiating a potential coalition; thirdly, it acts as a form of psychological positioning, so that both sides are aware of the other’s feelings when it comes to the negotiating table after the election, as well as their particular priorities.

In reality, the FDP are likely to be happy to work with the CDU, having now not been in national government for the last 11 years, a long time for a group that had, up until 1998, participated in Federal governing coalitions for 41 of the previous 49 years.


The Future

Bearing all of this in mind, it is now worth asking ourselves what will follow this marriage of inconvenience.

Possible Outcomes
1) A CDU/FDP Coalition (or a Jamaica Coalition, but this is unlikely)
2) Traffic Light Coalition (pretty unlikely)
3) Continuation of the Grand Coalition (very unlikely)


1) A CDU/FDP Coalition
The most likely outcome. Both parties appear consistently strong in the polls, have been able to position themselves well, and have a long history of working together in Federal government. If they do not achieve an outright majority then the ‘Jamaica’ option exists of bringing the Green party into the coalition (with the party colours of Black, Yellow and Green representing the Jamaica flag). Whilst this seems unlikely, based on the Green refusal to work with the CDU in 2005, it is not entirely impossible; there are some examples of subsequent sub-national cooperation, such as the CDU/Green coalition formed in governing Hamburg since 2008. If it were to happen, it would almost certainly require a change of national leadership in one or both parties, on account of existing animosity.

2) Traffic Light Coalition
It is unlikely that the Red-Green option would be able to achieve a majority on their own, even with a good showing by the Green party. The SPD have found it difficult to get away from their position as an incumbent government in which they no longer appear to be the leaders. The FDP have also reaffirmed their 2005 decision not to work with the SPD and Greens.10 There has been some talk of a Red-Red-Green variant with the Left Party, based on their coalition with the SPD in Berlin since 2001. However, the SPD as a whole would be likely to find the demands that the Left Party would make on such national issues as foreign and economic policy unpalatable.11

3) Continuation of the Grand Coalition
If all other options fail, this could happen, but, if it does, I believe it would only result in more serious damage to both parties, haemorrhaging voters who feel they want a real alternative to defeat the incumbents. It may also appear impractical to form a coalition which, whilst holding considerable power in the lower house remained unable to command a majority in the upper on its own.

Conclusion

There is, I would suggest, a right time and place for grand coalitions. Whether, in light of the economic crisis, it was fortunate that such a coalition existed in Germany or not, it is too early to speculate on. It would seem clear however, that it should not continue for the interests both of the parties involved. However, nothing can be taken for granted, as was witnessed in 2005 when a clear CDU-FDP poll lead was whittled down, failing to produce a majority. Even recently, on the 30th August, the CDU suffered heavy losses in several Lander elections, leading to further doubts over the accuracy of national opinion polls.12 Yet any weakness here is not automatically balanced by SPD strength, with the Left Party also doing well in those elections. Neither side has ruled out returning again to the Grand Coalition. Disraeli once said that no government can long survive without a formidable opposition. Arguably, any that do survive ultimately create an opposition capable of destroying them politically. Even in a country where there remains a great spirit of consensus over such issues as the Social Market economy, it may well be that a continued Grand Coalition increases the number of disenchanted and disaffected voters, opponents far more formidable to a government than any political party.



(Photograph is of the current leaders of Germany's Grand Coalition holding their first cabinet meeting of 2006. Source: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/11/eng20060111_234537.html)